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BOOK REVIEW

Emotions and Care: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Sophie Bourgault and Elena Pulcini (editors). Leuven: Peeters,
2018 (ISBN 978-90-429-3711-6)

Maurice Hamington
Portland State University, Portland, Oregon, USA; Email: Maurice4@pdx.edu

Academic publishers are wary of anthologies. Concerns over marketing appeal, consistent quality across submissions, and clarity of unified theme make single-authored volumes a preferred publication. Those concerns do not apply to the introduction and
eleven chapters that make up Emotions and Care: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited
by Sophie Bourgault and Elena Pulcini. Bourgault, a political theorist from the
University of Ottawa, and Pulcini, a social philosopher at the University of Florence,
have curated a volume of consistently high-quality explorations of the role of emotion
in care. This is a unique project because, although theorists have persistently argued for
the role of emotion in care ethics, there has been no sustained book-length work on the
subject.
For American audiences, this volume is an important reminder that some of the
most innovative work being done in care theory is taking place outside of the United
States. With figures such as Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, and Joan Tronto, it is understandable that Americans might feel parochial about care ethics. However, for some
time, sophisticated and provocative literature on care ethics has been produced around
the world. The chapters in Emotions and Care feature six Italian scholars, two French
scholars, and one scholar each from Canada, Germany, and The Netherlands. This
book is an English and slightly modified version of the Italian book Cura ed emozioni
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2018). The publisher, Peeters, has, as of this writing, the only book
series on care ethics in the world, totally eight volumes so far. The series editorial board
is led by Chief Editor Frans Vosman (The Netherlands), Hellen Kohlen (Germany), and
Sandra Laugier (France). Emotions and Care is another example of how care scholarship
is truly an international intellectual phenomenon on the rise.
In the introduction, Bourgault and Pulcini offer three aims for the volume: to look
back on what extant ethics of care literature has to say about emotion’s connection to
moral knowledge and care work; to integrate new approaches to and different philosophical lenses for thinking about care and emotion by introducing the work of thinkers
not typically connected to care theory; and finally, to move across disciplines including
social anthropology, literature, developmental psychology, gender studies, political science, paleo-anthropology, sociology, and philosophy. Ultimately, Bourgault and Pulcini
argue for the significance of this study by contending that “care is the testimony par
excellence of the ethical potential of the emotions, and it is by developing a finer-grained
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analysis of the emotions involved in care—both positive and negative—that we might be
able to find new tools for distinguishing between merely adequate care and good care”
(16).
The quality is so consistently high across the chapters of this volume that I will
briefly discuss each chapter rather than just a few highlights. Following the introduction, Pulcini offers a slightly modified version of an article that appeared in Emotion
Review, “What Emotions Motivate Care?” (Pulcini 2017). Pulcini acknowledges that
many theorists have discussed emotion’s role in care ethics, but she finds that these
treatments largely lack differentiation among affective responses. By contrast, she
aims to “emphasize the distinction between various emotions that inspire care” (15).
One distinction is between positive and negative emotions. Citing the tendency of
moral sentimentalists to focus on positive emotions, Pulcini indicates that both positive
and negative emotions can motivate care. For example, we might act out of fear for
someone. In an intriguing response to moral sentimentalists like Michael Slote (Slote
2007), Pulcini describes empathy as a morally neutral affective state that gives rise to
a variety of emotions (20). She usefully delineates three types of caring relationships—
care out of love, care work, and care toward the unknown other—each of which invokes
different passions and affective states.
Next, in “The Work of Emotions,” Fabienne Brugère offers a sweeping analysis of the
Western philosophical tradition whereby the ethics of care’s concern for relationships
and the attending emotions “questions a philosophical tradition that has largely been
structured around the endorsement of universalist and corrective morality” (38). She
finds vulnerability to be the state of both caregiver and care receiver (42). Addressing
figures such as Kant, Hume, and Rawls with a feminist analysis, Brugère views care
as describing a relational moral maturity eschewed by the philosophical tradition.
This relational maturity has emotional intelligence as an indispensable element, provided the emotions are properly deconstructed and undergo a feminist reconstruction
in light of power relations: “The moral voices of care are thus voices of resistance that
call for a morality that is invested by a kind of authenticity in the emotional modes of
relating to others and to oneself” (55).
Complementing the first two contributions, sociologist Patricia Paperman, in “Love,
Gender and Moral Sensibility: A Political (His)story,” views care ethics as properly valorizing care work in a world (and among theorists) that often devalues it. Like Pulcini,
she is concerned about discussions of emotion that lack nuance, and like Brugère, she
finds feminist analysis central to understanding care. Paperman is particularly critical of
theoretical dualisms that permeate Western narratives, such as the reason versus emotion dichotomy: “in contrast to such dualistic theorizing, the perspective of care ethics
brings sentiments and sensibility back to the only regions where they can be regarded as
having social meaning, legitimacy and intelligibility: namely, within practical activities”
(69). Without stating it so crudely, Paperman argues that care ethics is much more realistic about the human condition than analytic positions that break down experience
into categorical forms. She argues, “Care ethics refuses this compartmentalization
and invites us to consider sentiments and moral sensibility always with an eye to the
concrete affairs of daily life, always with an eye to what is important, what matters to
create and sustain a common world” (70).
In recent years and various publications, Caterina Botti has endeavored to reexamine
Carol Gilligan’s work in order to establish care ethics as an alternative moral paradigm
rather than a complement to rationalist approaches (Botti 2014; 2015). She begins the
chapter by reviewing Gilligan’s formulation of care ethics, concluding that it requires
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“caring for the relation between oneself and others, caring for oneself and others in relations, and caring for the network of relations that sustain life or our world at various
levels” (80). Botti turns to sentimentalist readings of care through Annette Baier (via
Hume) and Slote. She finds the ideas of imagination and humility to be central.
Ultimately, individuals must transform the self (88), which requires imaginative outreach and an openness to questioning oneself found in a humble approach. Botti recognizes the messiness and liminality of care in that it values “laying oneself open,
listening to others and transforming oneself, while being aware that one can never
completely escape oneself and one’s own limits” (90). Botti has laid the groundwork
for further study of sentimental communication that integrates imagination and
humility.
In “Rethinking the Moral Importance of Empathy,” Monika Betzler takes up the
connection between morality and empathy but approaches the subject differently
from Slote or Pulcini. Betzler begins by describing four possible connections between
empathy and morality: 1) Empathy can be a motivation for morality; 2) Both empathy
and morality are other-directed; 3) What is morally right is what an ideal empathizer
would empathize with; 4) Empathy provides the normative value that drives action.
Betzler favors the fourth connection: empathy can provide “access to emotional information that can serve as a morally relevant epistemic reason” (96) such as another person suffering. To explain empathy, Betzler turns to the novel Days of Abandonment by
Elena Ferrante (Ferrante 2005), using the dialog to suggest, among other things, that
empathy is more than emotional contagion and that it is possible to empathize with
experiences that we have not had ourselves. For Betzler, “empathy establishes a valuable
relation as it manifests an intimate bond that is at the core of our close relationships”
(101). However, to have this value, the empathy must be sincere, accurate, and reasonably represent the originating experience (102). Betzler makes a number of provocative
claims about empathy, including that sometimes it is morally required that we abstain
from empathizing (109), empathy can be tempered by impartial considerations (111),
and it needs to be matched to the circumstance (110).
Inge van Nistelrooij has previously explored the relationship of care to sacrifice (van
Nistelrooij 2014; 2015). In “Affective Coexistence. Pity as a Connection between
Emotion and Ethical Knowledge,” van Nistelrooij begins by reviewing four positions
taken by care theorists: 1) Caring rejects self-sacrifice; 2) Caring values self-effacing
involvement but rejects self-sacrifice; 3) Caring acknowledges the risk of self-sacrifice
but connects it to power; 4) Caring values self-sacrifice but does not think it through
fully. Van Nistelrooij takes up the role of emotion in the relation of care to self-sacrifice
and intriguingly finds pity to be a useful emotion. She defines it as “the primary abandonment of the self without which one cannot really pay attention to the good, because
pity is given from the exterior and opens the self-enclosed subject by affecting it. Pity is
a bodily feeling, affecting and decentering the subject, thereby opening the way to ethics” (122). This is the first defense of pity I have ever read (although Bourgault also
addresses pity in this volume), and Nistelrooij makes a compelling case for its positive
role.
As with the other authors in this volume, Guido Cusinato offers unique intellectual
provocations to existing care theory. In “Care and Birth: Emotional Sharing as the
Foundation of Care Relationships,” Cusinato applies a philosophy of birth to explore
the notion that every encounter with another is a rebirth. Noting that humans are
the only mammals that cry at birth, he views the birth cry as instantiating the foundational need for care that in some senses extend the birth beyond the moment of egress.
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He relates “care” and “cure” as enriching each other by “converging and embracing the
applications of the other” (143). This convergence is made possible by emotional sharing, of which empathy is a particular form. Cusinato suggests that emotional sharing is
indicative of our relational ontology but can be cultivated to a position beyond envy:
profound respect.
Luigina Mortari’s “Affective Self-Understanding: A Way to Care for the Self” interestingly contrasts with van Nistelrooij’s discussion of self-sacrifice. Mortari views selfcare as essential to care for others. She defines care of the self in epistemological
terms: “caring for oneself means knowing how we think and how we feel . . . To care
for oneself, therefore, is an essentially noetic activity, one that is, that uses thought”
(171–72). Using a phenomenological method, Mortari advocates “affective selfunderstanding,” a method of reflective thinking and feeling. This is the key notion:
care is really thinking and feeling, which is consistent with the Socratic method
(170) even if contemporary analytic approaches eschew the emotions. According to
Mortari, we need to live the “affective life,” which is an extension of the examined life.
Sophie Bourgault comes to a conclusion similar to Mortari’s in regard to the integration of thinking and feeling in “Care as Attentiveness: Weilian reflections on the
Affective and Cognitive Dimension of Care.” Bourgault’s emphasis is on the role of
attention, and for this she draws upon Simone Weil. Like van Nistelrooij’s abandonment of the self, Bourgault finds that Weil’s framing of attention is rooted in desire promoting “unselfing” (197). That desire, according to Weil, is directed toward
understanding. The implications of this analysis are many. The drive to understand
is a kind of mitigated emotion, or what Weil refers to as “cool emotion” (202), implying
a reflective distance. Bourgault speculates, “by modulating the role that strong emotional investment plays (or ought to play?) in attentiveness and in caring for others
at large, we might nevertheless open up new avenues for thinking the extent to
which vast state institutions (or the employees who work within them) can attend to
needs and attend to particulars in any meaningful sense, without risking emotional
exhaustion” (203). Accordingly, rather than an unreasonable demand, caring attentiveness can be a structured aspect of professionalism.
Demonstrating the high level of thematic integration in this volume, Vincenzo
Sorrentino’s “Existence, Care, and Emotions” explores the notion of emotional modulation found in Bourgault’s chapter. After defining care as an ethical practice in which
“the self opens up towards the other” (212), Sorrentino makes an existential observation
about the pervasive need for care. Agreeing with Mortari, he claims that care is correlated with “different tonalities” (221) that are adapted to the context and best described
by a “continuum of emotions” (222). Thus, attunement to particular others is essential
to good care (225). Sorrentino concludes with the notion that empathy is ethically neutral and requires a desire for the good of the other (225). He reinforces the idea that care
is both a practice and a disposition requiring some level of emotional involvement with
the other.
In the most empirically driven chapter, Rosanna Trifiletti examines the affective
experiences of migrant home care workers in “Emerging Emotions and Empathy
Maps amongst Migrant Care Workers in Three Cities in Central Italy.” Trifiletti begins
by describing the circumstances of home care workers in Italy: driven by market forces,
care workers spend fewer hours with each person and take on more clients (236). Many
migrants thus become trapped by taking on a large number of temporary clients with
frequent turnover (239). Trifiletti provides observations on gender differences in care
attitudes and behavior. For example, she finds male care workers are less likely to
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engage in physical comforting activities. Nevertheless, all care workers have some level
of discomfort with the contractually obligated level of care and the level of intimacy and
compassion often called for by the circumstances. She concludes by viewing care as a
common good that can circulate across distance (in terms of migration) and time
(across generations) (247).
Those with an interest in care as an ethical theory or as a practice will find value in
this well-conceived volume. Bourgault and Pulcini introduce readers to scholars they
may not have previously read in regard to care, and in turn the contributors utilize figures such as Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, and Edith Stein who are not typically referenced in the care literature. My only qualm with the collection is that it does not have
a subject index, which I think is crucial for a collected volume. Otherwise, I think
Emotions and Care: Interdisciplinary Perspectives is a must-read for those engaging in
care research today.
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